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Abstr-acrt 
In February 1942, during the earliest planning stages for 
post-war Europe, Austria was seen as a 'hideously complicated 
problem'•'- by Washington and London alike. Surprisingly, when one 
considers existing literature on the post-war occupation of Austria, 
this sentiment remains a fitting description of Anglo-American re-
lations with Austria during the ten years of the Allied occupation. 
For me, born in occupied Vienna and growing up in that city during 
the 1960s, this is a compelling revelation, since during that period 
one of the most powerful staples of the political education of young 
Austrians was that Austria had been saved by the Americans and the 
British from a fate worse than occupation - that of Communism. 
My own recent examination of an aspect of US post-war foreign 
policy and practice and their effects on Anglo-American relations^ 
raised a fundamental question: why did Austria remain occupied for 
ten long years, when the conditions for evacuation, as set down by 
the Allies during the war, had been fulfilled within the first nine 
months after liberation? To appreciate the significance of this 
question, it is crucial to understand what the aims of the Allies 
were. Austria was to be separated from Germany originally in a de-
liberate attempt to weaken the German war effort and then to deprive 
Germany permanently of Austrian support. To achieve this purpose, 
the Allies decided to restore Austria to independence. The condi-
tions for independence would be deemed to be satisfied once Austria 
was demilitarised, her administration severed from that of Germany, 
adequate denazification measures in progress, and a freely elected 
Austrian government installed. By the end of 1945 these conditions 
were fulfilled. Why, then, did Austria have to wait until 1955 to 
regain her freedom? 
^ Minute by Geoffrey Harrison, 27 February 1942, PRO, FO 371/30942, 
C2401 
^ M.Denton, 'No Way to Conduct an Alliance': Britain, the United 
States and Formosa, 1950 (Honours thesis. University of 
Wollongong, 1987) 
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Although this question has not been asked for the first time, 
the small body of literature which attempts to answer it has done so 
only in a limited way. Most noticeable in existing treatises on the 
subject is an emphasis on the relations between Austria and the 
Soviet Union and a bias towards acceptance of the Cold War thesis as 
proclaimed by the Americans. The Soviets, no doubt, until recently 
made comfortable villains and this may be part of the reason for the 
prominence given to the occupation period up to 1950. The years 1951 
to 1955 are usually either ignored or given short shrift. It would 
appear that 1950 has presented a convenient point of termination for 
those who contend that Soviet intransigence prevented the conclusion 
of an Austrian treaty. By emphasising Soviet unwillingness to re-
spond favourably to Anglo-American demands and, I suggest, by giving 
too much credence to the letter rather than the spirit of American 
documents, a skewed picture has been allowed to emerge, perpetuating 
the myth of the American saviour. 
My primary aim, then, has been twofold: to investigate the 
portrayal of America as the party which untiringly strove to free 
Austria from the occupation, and to explore the British part in the 
occupation and assess its effect on Anglo-Austrian as well as Anglo-
American relations. To that end I have examined British and American 
policy towards Austria and the Soviet Union, Anglo-American tactics 
at treaty negotiations, and the extent to which London and Washing-
ton took Austrian wishes and complaints into consideration. This 
raised many important questions. Why, for instance, was there such 
disagreement, particularly after 1950, between Britain and the 
United States over the benefits to Western security of ending the 
occupation? In what ways did British and American assessment of 
Soviet policy differ between 1943 and 1955, and what effect, if any. 
•̂  Cf. W.B.Bader, Austria Between East and West, 1945-1955 (Stanford, 
1966); G.J.Bischof, Between Responsibility and Rehabilitation: 
Austria in International Politics, 1940-1950 (PhD 
dissertation. Harvard University, 1989); A.K.Cronin, Great 
Power Politics and the Struggle over Austria, 1945-1955 
(Cornell University Press, 1986); M.Rauchensteiner, Der 
Sonderfall: Die Besatzungszeit in Oesterreich 1945-1955 (Graz, 
1985); G.Stourzh, Geschichte des Staatsvertrages 1945-1955 
(Graz, 1985) 
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did Austrian demands to end the occupation have on British and Amer-
ican views of Austria's role in Europe? 
The answers emerging paint a fascinating picture of Britain as 
the original cold warrior - both under Churchill and Attlee - but 
then, as the American ideological crusade gained momentum, insisting 
on a common-sense solution to Austrian security and Austria's place 
in Western Europe. Britain's pragmatic approach to the Austrian 
problem was, however, repeatedly frustrated by American intransi-
gence and by Britain's own efforts to safeguard her economic inter-
ests in Austria. The evidence also suggests strongly that from 1948 
onward American military considerations prevented the ending of the 
occupation until, in 1955, it was no longer politically feasible to 
keep it going. By 1955 the Americans feared that their failure to 
sign the treaty would prejudice the containment of Soviet Russia by 
encouraging further Austrian-Soviet bilateral deals. They also 
feared being placed in an untenable propaganda position by remaining 
the only occupying power unwilling to end the occupation. These 
factors and a shift in emphasis of US foreign policy towards Asia, 
as well as a greater reliance on massive retaliation rather than 
mere containment, determined American action in 1955. 
A crucial consequence of Austria's occupation was her choice 
of neutral status after being nurtured as a 'Western outpost' for 
ten years. It has invariably been asserted by writers outside 
Austria that neutrality was imposed by Moscow. But this is far too 
simplistic a view. The question needs to be asked, in what way did 
Austrian assessment of Soviet policy differ from British or American 
assessment, and why did Austria's initial sense of relief at the 
arrival of American and British occupation forces change to dis-
illusionment? It is my contention that Austria embraced neutrality 
because satisfying the role imposed by the United States had become 
an intolerable burden and threatened - as, indeed, was acknowledged 
by some of the more determined cold warriors in Washington - to last 
for the duration of the East-West conflict. This, as we now know, 
would have added some thirty-five years to the occupation. 
Austria's own part in the ending of the occupation has not 
been adequately explored. The Austrian Government, if its actions 
are considered at all, is often treated as if it were a homogeneous 
entity, when in fact it consisted of the representatives of two dia-
metrically opposed ideologies, who as recently as 1934 had fought a 
civil war against each other, A fundamental question, therefore, is 
why did the two major political parties in Austria - the Socialist 
Party (SPG), comprising Socialdemocrats and its left-wing faction, 
the Revolutionary Socialists, and the People's Party (OVP), an amal-
gamation of conservative Christiansocials and former right-wing cor-
porate-state enthusiasts - co-operate in a coalition government 
throughout the occupation? What problems did the leaders of the 
coalition parties face, and why did the Socialist Party half-way 
through the occupation insist on the formation of new political 
parties? The importance of these issues lies in the essential con-
nection between the burden imposed by the occupation, the potential 
for serious internal instability which it engendered, and the grow-
ing disaffection between Austria and the Anglo-American powers. 
I have divided the thesis into ten chapters. The running civil 
wars between Socialist and Conservative forces during the 1920s and 
early 1930s - culminating in the brutal suppression of Austrian 
Socialdemocracy by the authoritarian Dollfuss Government in 1934 -
were pivotal in the forcible incorporation of Austria into the 
German Reich in 1938. Chapter One explores Anglo-American attitudes 
in the 1930s to the civil war and to the Anschluss in order to show 
what bearing they had later on Allied planning. The Allied procla-
mation in November 1943 that Austria was to be re-established as an 
independent state is examined in the light of the first of many ser-
ious misconceptions about Austrian aspirations, the belief - very 
likely inspired by Churchill's predilection for a Danubian Empire 
centred on Vienna - that independence held little appeal for the 
Austrians. 
Chapter Two shows how as early as 1944 British assessment of 
Soviet aims in Europe and the presumed threat to British European 
policy clashed with the Americans' preoccupation with the Far East 
and caused considerable disagreement between the two governments 
over the proposed post-war control of Austria. By 1945 Britain saw 
itself as the only power sufficiently aware of and prepared to fight 
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the Soviet-led Communist threat to Europe. It was this notion of its 
role in Europe that caused the British Government to refuse recog-
nition of the Austrian Provisional Government established by Karl 
Renner in Soviet-occupied Vienna in April 1945. The ensuing dis-
agreement between the British and US governments provides one of the 
earliest examples of the Austrian Government quietly proceeding with 
the administration of the country while the occupying powers fought 
amongst themselves. British reactions to the Provisional Govern-
ment's preparations for the first post-war elections, to be held in 
November 1945, offer an instructive glimpse of British anxiety over 
the Communist threat, a concern which was only temporarily allevi-
ated when the Austrian Communists suffered a decisive defeat in the 
elections. 
The focus of Chapter Three is the first battle of wills be-
tween the Austrian Government and the occupation forces over the 
inordinate number of occupation troops in Austria and the devas-
tating burden they imposed on the country's resources and popula-
tion. This chapter also explores the different responses by the 
British and Americans to these complaints and to the Communist 
threat thought to be posed to Austria's future independence. In 
direct contrast to their attitudes after 1950, in 1946 the Americans 
wanted a quick end to the occupation, whereas the British saw the 
problem as one of physical protection of Austria by the presence of 
Anglo-American occupation troops to deter the Soviet military, and 
insistence on co-operation between the Socialist Party and the 
People's Party to forestall the Austrian Communists. 
The ambiguities in British policy towards liberated Austria 
are explored in Chapter Four. These include the war-guilt clause 
contained in the British draft treaty, perceived as a monstrous 
injustice by the Austrians, who protested that they had been the 
victims of Nazism. The British draft also set the stage for a pro-
tracted battle between HMG and the Austrian Government, supported by 
Moscow, over British oil interests in Austria. In 1947 the first 
negotiations for an Austrian treaty witnessed a new-found deter-
mination by the Americans to defy the Soviets' alleged economic sub-
version of Austria. The resulting conflict between the Austrian 
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leaders, who saw the Soviet claims as reparation demands susceptible 
to business-like settlement between Vienna and Moscow, and the 
Anglo-American negotiators, whose tactics were believed to prolong 
needlessly the occupation and thus pose a threat to internal stabil-
ity, contributed to Austrian disenchantment with Western aims and to 
Austrian determination not to participate in ideological crusades 
against the Soviet Union. 
The impact of the Communist coup in Prague and of deteriorat-
ing East-West relations in Berlin on Anglo-American willingness to 
grant Austria her freedom are examined in Chapter Five. British 
policy had changed from the notion prevalent in 1946, that Austria 
should be protected from Communism by the physical presence of West-
ern troops, to the conviction that a politically stable Austria -
which in Britain's opinion could only be guaranteed by the conclu-
sion of the treaty and the ending of the occupation - was vital to 
British European policy. In contrast, the worsening international 
ideological conflict saw the emergence in the United States Govern-
ment of a policy of 'no treaty, but keep pretending'. The period 
also saw a shift in relations between Austria and the Anglo-American 
occupation forces. The administrative authorities were believed to 
be reactionary, insulting and insensitive, and Anglo-American troops 
were rivalling early Soviet behaviour in their treatment of the pop-
ulation. Austrian awareness of the Western Powers' reluctance to 
evacuate the country provoked a campaign against the occupying pow-
ers and a growing inclination to embrace neutrality as an answer to 
the problem. 
Chapter Six analyses the effects on the treaty negotiations of 
American domestic disputes over US foreign policy and the consequent 
unwillingness on the part of the Austrian Socialists to continue to 
restrain their political ambitions for the sake of American Soviet 
policy. It was during this period, when the hard-liners were gaining 
the upper hand in Washington, that the British - conscious of the 
potential harm to Austrian-Western relations - argued most fervently 
in favour of an end to the occupation. 
Anglo-American efforts to keep Austria 'friendly' are examined 
in Chapter Seven. These efforts are scrutinised against a background 
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of the waning fortunes of the British Labour Government and US de-
termination to keep Austria occupied until East-West relations in 
general were resolved in America's favour. Closely linked to Anglo-
American inertia on the treaty question were the Austrian Govern-
ment's difficulties in dealing satisfactorily with the economic 
grievances of the Austrian workers, leading to the incongruous situ-
ation of the Government having to defend itself both against Commu-
nist-led disturbances and efforts by the Western occupation powers 
to safeguard their own economic interests in Austria. 
The introduction in 1952 of the so-called abbreviated treaty, 
one of the most provocative actions of the Americans, is examined in 
Chapter Eight. This proposed treaty set both the British.and French 
against Washington and had the unintended effect of being welcomed 
by Austria as an 'evacuation instrument'. At the same time, one of 
the most galling issues of the occupation - the requirement that 
Austria pay for occupation costs - led to serious disagreement be-
tween Britain and the United States, as the US Government attempted 
to lessen the burden on Austria while insisting on onerous rearma-
ment measures for Britain. 
Chapter Nine covers the period from October 1952 to February 
1954. It deals with the essential connection between the constraints 
of the continuing occupation and the emergence of those political 
forces in Austria which favoured Austrian-Soviet bilateral negotia-
tions to gain Austrian freedom, and saw neutrality as the deciding 
factor in future negotiations. These developments also witnessed a 
reassessment by Britain of Austria's role in Europe, thus bringing 
both Austria and Britain into conflict with US aims concerning 
Western defence. 
The concluding chapter examines the last year of the occu-
pation, when Austrian leaders defied Anglo-American efforts to keep 
Austria 'on ice' and engaged directly in negotiations with Moscow, 
promising Moscow the security of a neutral Austria in exchange for 
Austria's freedom. 
The evidence has vindicated my doubts about the received 
opinion of the American role in the prolonged occupation. The por-
trayal of America the Saviour is changed to one of a determined 
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ideological warrior, whose grip on Austria was relaxed only when 
continuation of the occupation threatened to damage the overarching 
aim of containing the Soviet Union. Anglo-Austrian relations during 
this period were determined by the inherent conflict between 
Britain's political aims for Austria and Britain's economic hard-
ships, which obliged dependence on American goodwill regarding 
European security. A comment made early during the occupation by an 
Austrian diplomat in Washington is suggestive of the complexities 
governing Anglo-American-Austrian relations. He warned his govern-
ment that although the US Government's aims in respect of the occu-
pation coincided with those of the Austrian Government, ultimately 
Washington would bow to the needs of Britain if a conflict between 
Austrian and British interests arose.'* Yet as the occupation pro-
gressed, the tables were turned and London bowed to American policy 
in prolonging the occupation. Thus, as a result of the British 
Labour Government's demise in 1951 and the weakening of the British 
will in the face of American obduracy, the Austrian Government pur-
sued the idea of neutrality as the only alternative to continued 
occupation. By 1955 the Soviet Government, driven by pragmatic 
rather than ideological considerations, represented the only reason-
able negotiating partner in the Austrians' quest for independence. 
A Note on Sources 
My research for this study coincided with an extraordinarily 
sensitive time in Austrian political affairs. When I first arrived 
in Vienna at the beginning of 1988, Austria was beleaguered by alle-
gations, widely reported in the Anglo-American press, that her head 
of state. President Kurt Waldheim, was a war criminal. At the same 
time, the 50th anniversary of the Anschluss resurrected old differ-
ences over whether or not Austria had welcomed the Nazis in 1938. As 
a consequence, English-speaking scholars were viewed with consider-
able suspicion by the Austrian Government and the repercussions of 
this on my research were only too apparent. Access to Austrian 
^ Ludwig Kleinwaechter to Karl Gruber, 23 April 1946, Austrian State 
Archives, AdR, BMAA, K5, 110.850-111.192 
Foreign Ministry papers was severely restricted, all papers under-
going renewed inspection by the Foreign Ministry before their re-
lease to the archives. This situation was partly alleviated by the 
sympathetic consideration of my requests by Dr Kurt Peball, Direc-
tor-General of the Austrian State Archives. Nevertheless, my re-
peated applications for access to Cabinet papers have elicited no 
reply to date. Thus, although I have undertaken four research trips 
to Austria since 1988, these restrictions necessarily limited the 
amount of data gathered from Austrian archives. However, I have been 
able to supplement this data with some excellent published document 
collections^ and several contemporary accounts by leading Austrian 
figures. 
The Public Record Office in London has proved a veritable 
gold-mine of information on Austria. I have made extensive use of 
Foreign Office papers. Cabinet papers and the collections of the 
Prime Minister's Private Office. The holdings of the Austrian and 
British archives have been complemented by the invaluable series. 
Foreign Relations of the United States, published by the State 
Department. As well, I have had access to unpublished CIA reports 
and State Department documents from the Harry S. Truman Library, 
kindly lent to me by my supervisor, Dr Ian McLaine. 
*** 
^ E.M.Csaky (ed), Der Weg zu Freiheit und Neutralitaet: 
Dokumentation zur oesterreichiscben Aussenpolitik 1945-1955 
(Vienna, 1980); A.Schilcher (ed), Oesterreich und die 
Grossmaechte: Dokumente zur oesterreichiscben Aussenpolitik 
1945-1955 (Vienna, 1980) 
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ATC Austrian Treaty Commission 
BMAA Bundesministerium fuer Auswaertige Aagelegenheiten 
CFM Council of Foreign Ministers 
CIA Central Intelligence Agency 
EAC European Advisory Commission 
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